BinComp: A stratified approach to compiler provenance Attribution  by Rahimian, Ashkan et al.
ilable at ScienceDirect
Digital Investigation 14 (2015) S146eS155Contents lists avaDigital Investigation
journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate/di inDFRWS 2015 USABinComp: A stratiﬁed approach to compiler provenance
Attribution*
Ashkan Rahimian, Paria Shirani, Saed Alrbaee*, Lingyu Wang, Mourad Debbabi
Computer Security Laboratory, Concordia Institute for Information Systems Engineering, Concordia University, Montreal, Quebec, CanadaKeywords:
Compiler provenance
Reverse engineering
Binary program analysis
Digital forensics
Programming analysis* This research is the result of a fruitful collab
Computer Security Laboratory (CSL) of Concordia
Research and Development Canada (DRDC) Valcartie
DND/NSERC Research Partnership Program.
* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: s_alraba@encs.concordia.ca (S. A
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.diin.2015.05.015
1742-2876/© 2015 The Authors. Published by Else
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).a b s t r a c t
Compiler provenance encompasses numerous pieces of information, such as the compiler
family, compiler version, optimization level, and compiler-related functions. The extraction
of such information is imperative for various binary analysis applications, such as function
ﬁngerprinting, clone detection, and authorship attribution. It is thus important to develop
an efﬁcient and automated approach for extracting compiler provenance. In this study, we
present BinComp, a practical approach which, analyzes the syntax, structure, and seman-
tics of disassembled functions to extract compiler provenance. BinComp has a stratiﬁed
architecture with three layers. The ﬁrst layer applies a supervised compilation process to a
set of known programs to model the default code transformation of compilers. The second
layer employs an intersection process that disassembles functions across compiled binaries
to extract statistical features (e.g., numerical values) from common compiler/linker-
inserted functions. This layer labels the compiler-related functions. The third layer ex-
tracts semantic features from the labeled compiler-related functions to identify the
compiler version and the optimization level. Our experimental results demonstrate that
BinComp is efﬁcient in terms of both computational resources and time.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of DFRWS. This is an open access
articleunder theCCBY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Introduction
Program binaries are often the focus of forensic in-
vestigations, covering numerous issues ranging from
copyright infringement to malware analysis. Program bi-
nary analysis can be extremely challenging due to the
absence of high level information, which is found in source
code, and the myriad variations in compilers, versions, and
optimization levels (Balakrishnan & Reps, 2010). The term
compiler provenance refers to information about the
compiler family, compiler version, optimization level, andoration between the
University, Defence
r and Google under a
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vier Ltd on behalf of DFRWcompiler-related functions. Extracting compiler prove-
nance is important in digital forensics, as it provides crucial
information about the process by which a malware binary
is produced.
Few studies have been conducted on extracting
compiler provenance (Jacobson et al., 2011; Rosenblum
et al., 2010, 2011a). The existing body of work can be
considered as a series of pioneering efforts, beginning with
labeling functions in stripped binaries (Jacobson et al.,
2011), followed by identifying the source compiler of pro-
gram binaries (Rosenblum et al., 2010), and culminating in
recovering the toolchain provenance of binary code
(Rosenblum et al., 2011a). Inspired by such efforts, we
provide improvements by addressing the following issues:
1) the features used in the aforementioned works follow
generic templates, which may not always provide mean-
ingful information about compilers; 2) large data sets areS. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
Fig. 1. BinComp architecture.
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computational power and time are often needed to rank
the features. More recently, the compiler was identiﬁed in
Toderici and Stamp (2013) based on a hidden Markov
model that is intended for malware detection. However, it
does not extract information regarding the compiler
version or optimization level. Furthermore, there are
certain tools that are capable of identifying compilers (e.g.,
IDA Pro (IDA Pro multi-processor disassembler and
debugger, ), PEiD (The PEiD tool, ), and RDG (The RDG
Packer Detector)); however, these tools typically suffer
from various drawbacks. For instance, most of these tools
apply an exact matching algorithm, which may fail when
even a slight difference between signatures is present.Motivation
Our motivation is twofold:
 Existing techniques (Rosenblum et al., 2010, 2011a) rely
on generic feature templates and feature ranking. This
usually leads to large amounts of irrelevant features and
consequently results in prohibitive time and computa-
tional complexity. Moreover, top-ranked features are
not necessarily related to the structure or semantics of
compiler-related functions. In contrast, BinComp uses
syntactic, semantic, and structural features to extract
compiler provenance in a more efﬁcient manner.
 Existing techniques (Rosenblum et al., 2010, 2011a) do
not explicitly label compiler-related functions, which
provides vital help to various tasks in binary analysis,
such as authorship attribution (Alrabaee et al., 2014;
Rosenblum et al., 2011b), function recognition
(Alrabaee et al., 2015; Ruttenberg et al., 2014; Stojanovic
et al., 2014), and clone detection (Edler et al., 2014;
Farhadi et al., 2014), in which ﬁltering out compiler-
related functions is a critical pre-processing step for
reducing false positives. In contrast, BinComp allows
labeling compiler-related functions.
Our approach is based on the hypothesis that compiler-
helper functions are preserved throughout the compilation
process. These functions can be used to identify the source
compiler of the binary. The stratiﬁed architecture of
BinComp consists of three layers. The ﬁrst layer extracts
syntax features, namely, Compiler Transformation Proﬁle
(CTP), and compiler tags (CT). The second layer extracts
Compiler Function (CF) features, which are represented as
symbolic and numerical feature vectors used to label the
compiler-related functions. This layer provides a list of
compiler-helper functions. The third layer extracts se-
mantic features, namely, the Compiler Constructor Termi-
nator (CCT) graph and the Annotated Control Flow Graph
(ACFG). This layer identiﬁes the version and the optimiza-
tion level from the helper functions. The architecture of
BinComp is illustrated in Fig. 1. Each layer relies on a
different detection technique: Layer 1 employs signatures
to perform exact matching; Layer 2 uses the distances be-
tween the numerical vectors to label compiler-related
functions; and Layer 3 extracts semantic graphs that arerepresented as feature vectors, after which hashing is
applied to control the granularity level over the program
components.
The novelty of the proposed approach is that it com-
bines prior knowledge of compiler code transformations
with an incremental learning component. This serves to
adjust source compiler features as well as to update them
when compiler-related functions undergo changes due to
new versions or updates. Our experimental results show
that BinComp identiﬁes compiler families effectively, and
that the approach is efﬁcient in terms of both time and
computational resources. This makes BinComp a practical
approach for binary analysis.
Contribution
Our paper makes following contributions:
 BinComp introduces a stratiﬁed approach which simul-
taneously achieves several goals, including compiler
identiﬁcation, compiler-related function labeling,
compiler version detection, and optimization level
recognition.
 The signatures used in most tools depend on meta-data
or other details of program headers. This can be prob-
lematic as such information might be unavailable in
stripped binaries or might be easily altered. However,
the signature used in BinComp relies on the character-
istics of the binary, which are available even in stripped
form.
 We evaluate BinComp on a large set of real-world bi-
naries across several compiler families, versions, and
optimization levels. Our results show that compiler
provenance can be extracted with high accuracy;
BinComp identiﬁes the compiler with an accuracy that is
above 0.90, the versionwith an average accuracy of 0.86
and the optimization level with accuracy of over 0.90.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:
Section Motivating Example provides a motivating
example. Section Evaluation of the ECP Approach in-
troduces the re-evaluation of the technique used by Rose-
nblum et al. Section BinComp Approach details the main
methodology. Section Evaluations evaluates the proposed
approach and provides comparisons against existing work.
Section Conclusion presents some concluding remarks on
this work together with a discussion of future research.
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Consider the simple program shown in Listing 1.
Compilation of this program with Visual Studio 2010 in
release mode results in 34 functions. These include one
user function (main), ﬁve library functions (e.g., iostream),
and 28 compiler-related functions. Subsequently, we
compile the same example with Visual Studio 2012. Upon
disassembling the binary, we ﬁnd 73 functions: three user
functions, 18 library functions, and 52 compiler-related
functions. By checking the compiler-related functions, we
ﬁnd that 25 functions remain the same. In addition, we
conduct the same simple experiment with a slightly com-
plex program, and we ﬁnd the same set of 25 compiler-
related functions. To obtain the exact list of these func-
tions, we intersect the sets of disassembled compiled bi-
naries. However, we cannot relymerely on the names of the
functions, as in most cases functions are given generic
names (i.e., sub-xxx) by the disassembler. Therefore, after
listing the helper functions (common compiler-related
functions), two feature vectors are created for each func-
tion, as detailed in BinComp Approach Section. These
feature vectors are used to ascribe a proﬁle to each
compiler.
In addition, we extract the compiler effect (compiler
transformation proﬁle) from the user functions, since
different compilers may generate distinct binary repre-
sentations for analogous source code. Several parameters,
such as compiler families, mapping proﬁles of operations to
instructions, conditional/loop structures, optimization op-
tions, etc., govern the way compilers transform code from
high-level source to low-level machine code. Listing 2
shows a simple C program consisting of a single function
call to printf. Listings 3, 4, and 5 display the compiled
versions with MSVC (Windows), GCC (Linux), and Clang
(OS X), respectively. It is evident that each compiler gen-
erates a different sequence of instructions for the source
program. Given a list of assembly functions (similar to
listings 3, 4, and 5) from a target disassembly, wewill show
how to identify the most likely compiler with which the
binary is built.Evaluation of the ECP approach
ECP models compiler identiﬁcation as a structured
classiﬁcation problem and labels each byte of the binaries
with the information whether it is compiled with one or
two compilers (statically linked code). The authors use
wildcards idiom features, which are deﬁned as short se-
quences of instructions that neglect details such as literal
arguments and memory offsets. After extracting the fea-
tures from a large number of binaries, redundant features
can be found, which are related to the user functions or the
architecture. Therefore, the authors consider top-ranked
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computation between the features and compiler classes.
They train the linear-chain model's parameters to assign
high probabilities to correct compiler classes. The proposed
technique is performed on three sets of binaries containing
code from three compilers: GNU C Compiler (GCC), Intel C
Compiler (ICC), and Visual Studio (VS). The data set is
collected for GCC and VS on Linux and Microsoft Windows
workstations, respectively. In addition, they have compiled
various open-source software packages with the ICC
compiler.
Most of these data sets are not publicly available. We
have collected different source ﬁles from various years of
the Google Code Jam (referred to as the G data set) (The
Google Code Jam, ) (2008e2014). We have also gathered
several source code samples from our university (referred
to as the U data set). Our experimental corpus comprises
three sets of binaries: GNU C Compiler (GCC), Intel C
Compiler (ICC), and Visual Studio compiler (VS). We
disassemble each program binary using IDA Pro (IDA Pro
multi-processor disassembler and debugger, ) dis-
assembler. Furthermore, we test their approach with an
additional compiler, Clang (XCode).ECP evaluation results
We generate our data set after considering all applicable
combinations of compilers, various data set combinations,
and different optimization levels. In what follows, we
discuss our results based on a speciﬁc process of validation.
First, we split the training data into ten sets, reserving one
set as a testing set. We then train a classiﬁer on the
remaining sets and evaluate its accuracy on the testing set.
In addition, we perform various experiments, as shown in
Fig. 2: (i) changing the number of ﬁles; (ii) modifying the
threshold value of the ranked features; and (iii) mixing
various percentages of data sets to observe the effect of
data set diversity. Finally, we measure the time efﬁciency
by showing the relationship between the number of fea-
tures and the total elapsed time.
The ECP approach can attain relatively high accuracy, as
shown in Fig. 2 (a), where the accuracy for the G data set is
between 0.89 and 0.98. This is higher than the accuracy
obtained using the U data set (min ¼ 0.82, max ¼ 0.95). ByFig. 2. Re-evaluation results: (a) Relation between accuracy and number of ﬁles (b)
datasets; (d) Time versus number of features.analyzing the source code, we ﬁnd out that the user
contribution in the U data set is greater than that of the G
data set. The U data set is also more complex than the G
data set, as it consists of classes, methods, etc. In addition,
we studied how changing the threshold value for the
number of top-ranked features affects accuracy. We ﬁnd
out that the accuracy of their method may depend on the
choice of the threshold value, as shown in Fig. 2 (b). For
instance, the best threshold values for GCC and XCode
compilers are 16,000 and 18,000, respectively. In practice,
ﬁnding the best threshold for a given compiler and data set
combination may be a task that is both time-consuming
and prone to errors.
Finally, we perform an experiment to study the effects of
data set diversity on accuracy, as illustrated in Fig. 2 (c). We
consider different percentages ofmixed data sets (e.g., 100%
G data set, and 20% G - 80% U data sets). As shown, the
accuracy decreases when the diversity of the data set in-
creases, especially when the percentage of university pro-
jects increases, since the user contribution in the U data set
is higher than that of the G data set. We measure the time
efﬁciency of the ECP approach by calculating the total
required time for feature extraction and feature ranking.
Fig. 2 (d) shows the total time versus the number of fea-
tures for different experiments.Discussion and limitation
The ECP approach represents pioneering effort on
compiler identiﬁcation and may attain relatively high ac-
curacy. This approach can also identify the compilers of
binaries containing a mixture of code from multiple com-
pilers, such as statically linked library code. However, a few
limitations could be observed. First, as the number of fea-
tures increases, the running time may increase even more
rapidly. Second, the features of speciﬁc compilers may only
become apparent after examining a large number of bi-
naries. Third, the accuracy may depend on both the data set
and the choice of threshold.
The BinComp approach
We present the different layers of our solution.Relation between accuracy and threshold of ranked features (c) Diversity in
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The purpose of in this layer is to derive unique signa-
tures for compilers by collecting a set of known source code
and observing the compiled outputs. We tailor BinComp to
C-family compilers due to their popularity and widespread
adoption, especially in the development of malicious pro-
grams (Lindorfer et al., 2012). The steps used in this layer
are displayed in Fig. 3. As can be seen, we use the artifacts of
each compilation step to generate speciﬁc types of features.
1. Pre-processing: The input of this step is the original
source code (SRC), and the output is a pre-processed
source ﬁle that includes the contents of header ﬁles
imported into the source code. The symbolic constants
are replaced with their values as a result of this process.
To support the signature generation process, we extract
the values of constants and the list of source-level
functions along with their prototypes.
2. Compilation: The expanded source ﬁle generated in
Step 1 is fed into the compilation step, which results in a
platform-dependent assembler ﬁle (IAS). In support of
the signature generation process, the list of assembly
functions is extracted.
3. Assembly: We use the disassembled version of the ob-
ject ﬁle (OBJ) dthe output of this stepd to extract the
relevant features. To support the signature generation
process, we match each assembly-level function with
the corresponding source-level function obtained from
Step 1. At this point, we are able to establish a mapping
between assembly code proﬁles (sequences) and the
source code. This mapping provides us with clues about
the compiler code transformation process and syntactic
styles (compiler transformation proﬁle, as described
later in BinComp Approach Section).
4. Linking: The linking step deals with the integration of
the library object code (LIB) with the user object code
(OBJ) built in Step 3 to produce the ﬁnal binary ﬁle (BIN).
5. Disassembly: We utilize the disassembled version of the
binary ﬁle to extract compiler tags (compiler tags are
described later in BinComp Approach Section).First layer: feature description
Compiler transformation proﬁle (CTP)
CTP is a syntactic feature that highlights how certain
syntactic source-level data and control structures (such as
conditional/unconditional jumps, loops, arrays, structs,
etc.) are reﬂected in the assembly output of compilers. The
compiler transformation proﬁle captures the code trans-
formation process and maps the chosen source-levelFig. 3. Compilation steps.statements to a sequence of assembly-level instructions
in order to proﬁle the code transformation for each
compiler. For instance, the assembly code translation of a
simple if/else construct involves a comparison instruction
followed by a conditional jump at the assembly level, which
can be stated as if/else: cmp or test, then jcc, in binaries
compiled by VS.
Compiler tags (CT)
Compilers may embed in output binaries certain tags in
the form of strings or constants. For instance, GCC-
compiled binaries carry a tag that survives even after the
symbol stripping process. Similarly, programs compiled
with VS have an XOR-encoded value in the ﬁle header
section that indicates the compiler version. These values
can therefore be considered as compiler indicators. We
apply a ﬁle parsing mechanism (PE/COFF/ELF) to obtain
such values.First layer: Detection method
All extracted features in this layer are recorded as
strings and used for exact matching. The features in this
layer, including the compiler transformation proﬁle and
compiler tags, captures the behavior of the compiler to
access primitive and composite data structures and code
structures (e.g., control statements, loop structures, register
utilization, and memory access). We combine them into a
single signature entity Sigci that is used to identify the
compiler ci.Second layer: Compiler functions labeling
The aim in this layer is to label compiler-related func-
tions. To support our goal, we select a pair of source pro-
grams P1 and P2 and direct them through the supervised
compilation process using the compiler ci. The outcome of
this process includes two sets of disassembled functions FP1
and FP2 as well as their corresponding symbolic V
!
s and
numeric V
!
n feature vectors for each function. We perform
a similarity measurement based on the numerical values of
feature vectors. We use a standard clustering algorithm (k-
means) (Farnstrom et al., ) to group functions with similar
attributes ðvn1 ;…; vnz Þ into k clusters S ¼ S1;…; Sk and
ðk  FP1
þ FP2
Þ to minimize the intra-cluster sum of
squares. In the following equation, mi denotes the mean of
the numerical feature values of each cluster.
arg min
S
Xk
i¼1
X
vj2Si
vj  mi
2 (1)
The parameter k may be estimated either by following
standard practices in k-means clustering (Farnstrom et al.,
), or by beginning with one cluster and continually
dividing the clusters until the points assigned to each
cluster have a Gaussian distribution as described in
Hamerly and Elkan (2004). If function names are available
in symbolic vectors (which is the case for debug binaries),
we would have the option to intersect functions based on
their symbolic names. In this case, we compute
Table 2
Proﬁling compiler functions based on numerical vectors.
COMP OPL Symbolic function ID DTR, DTO, FLG, ATH, LGC,
CTL, INO, INT, FLT, REG,
MEM, IMM, IFA, INA
VS OP2 @__security_check_cookie@4 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, 0, 0, 0, 001,
001, 000, 000, 002
VS OP2 ___tmainCRTStartup 3, 0, 1, 2, 1, 6, 0, 0, 0, 077,
028, 017, 000, 025
GCC OP0 ___mingw_CRTStartup 3, 1, 1, 3, 6, 7, 0, 0, 0, 216,
015, 068, 000, 071
GCC OP0 ___gcc_register_frame 3, 0, 1, 1, 0, 3, 0, 0, 0, 029,
001, 014, 000, 009
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!
P2 :namesðÞÞÞ, where the listðÞ
function returns the list of commonly disassembled func-
tions and the namesðÞmethod returns the property name of
each function.
Second layer: Feature description
Compiler functions (CF)
Compiler function features are extracted in two steps: i)
intersect a set of disassembled ﬁles, and ii) extract symbolic
and numerical vectors for each compiler function. Given a
target binary B (with unknown compiler) and its set of
disassembled functions FB ¼ ff1;…; fmg, which are classi-
ﬁed into two groups of functions (compiler-related func-
tions and user-related functions), we extract symbolic
feature vectors Vs ¼ fVs1 ;Vs2 ;…;Vszg and numerical feature
vectors Vn ¼ fVn1 ;Vn2 ;…;Vnzg from each disassembled
compiler/linker-related function fi2FB. We group the in-
structions according to the instruction categories as shown
in Table 1. The numerical vectors are generated using a
function ﬁngerprinting technique (Rahimian et al., 2013),
which encodes and quantiﬁes the syntactic and structural
features of binary functions. Table 2 shows an example of
numerical vectors.
Second layer: Detection method
We introduce a function ﬁngerprinting approach for the
generation and detection of abstract representations of
assembly functions. We consider a program P to be
comprised of a set of functions F ¼ ff1;…; fmg. A feature
extraction function X : F/S maps each function fi2F to a
set of features si2S, where F is the set of compiler/linker-
related functions and S is the set of all possible features:
si ¼ XðfiÞ (2)
We deﬁne G : S/T as a ﬁngerprint computation func-
tion that takes the set of features to generate the ﬁnger-
prints. Each ﬁngerprint ti2T represents the encoded
characteristics of function fi:
ti ¼ GðsiÞ ¼ GðXðfiÞÞ (3)
At a different level of abstraction, this function is similar
to a hash function since it generates a ﬁxed length output
for an arbitrary length assembly function and compresses
the information. However, this function computes the
output based on a normalized form of assembly in-
structions. This function can be interpreted as a semanticTable 1
Instruction Categories.
Feature Description Feature Description
DTR Data Transfer INA Indirect Near Address
INO Input/Output DTO Data Transfer Object
FLT Float Point FLG Flag Manipulation
REG Registers LGC Logical Instructions
MEM Memory CTL Control Instructions
IMM Immediate Value IFA Indirect Far Address
INT Interrupt/System ATH Arithmetic Instructionshash function, which builds a bit vector of length m from
the subset of features S that appear in fi. The mechanics of
the hash function can be balanced according to the required
level of strength (number of feature bits) and the size of the
feature space.
ti2domainðSÞ/f0;1gm (4)
For function ﬁngerprinting, we calculate the similarity
between pairs of functions. It is also necessary to determine
the similarity between a target function and a group of
functions (e.g., incremental clustering). The similarity
function M assigns a score to a pair of candidate ﬁnger-
prints using a similarity metric. The similarity score can be
computed at the level of features (i.e.,M0 : F  F/ℝþ) or at
the level of ﬁngerprints (i.e., M : T  T/ℝþ). There are
various metrics for the computation of vector similarity
scores (e.g., Jaccard similarity). Let ti and tj be two ﬁnger-
print vectors generated from the candidate function pairs
ðfi; fjÞ, respectively. The Jaccard similarity can be calculated
using the following equation (Gascon et al., 2013):
dJ

ti; tj
 ¼ S

ti∧tj

S

ti∨tj
 (5)
where the SðÞ function counts the number of ones in the
ﬁngerprint bit vector.Third layer: Version and optimization recognition
The aim in this layer is to detect the version and the
optimization level of the binary code. During the training
phase, we observe that two features are slightly distinct:
the annotated control ﬂow graph (ACFG) and the compiler
constructor terminator (CCT) graph. In such cases, we use
neighborhood hashing (Gascon et al., 2013) to provide a
level of granularity over the program components and
features used that is more reﬁned than graph encoding.Third layer: Feature description
Annotated control ﬂow graph (ACFG)
We present a new scheme, the Annotated Control Flow
Graph (ACFG), to efﬁciently detect the version and opti-
mization levels. It is an abstracted version of the CFG, which
generalizes speciﬁc types of CFG features according to
multiple criteria. We build an annotated control ﬂow graph
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to the type of operations that take place in each basic block.
Each node in this graph represents a basic block, and each
edge connects basic block B1 to basic block B2 if basic block
B2 can directly follow basic block B1 in execution. The
method for extracting an ACFG can be summarized in the
following steps: First, we consider a CFG as an input and
compute the frequency of opcodes across instruction
groups. Second, each assembly instruction can be catego-
rized according to the mnemonic groups and types of op-
erands. As one category, the x86 instructions can be
classiﬁed into six groups, as shown in Table 3. Third, we
treat the ACFG as a structural feature and complement it
with subgraph encoding values.
Deﬁnition 1. An Annotated Control Flow Graph
ACFG ¼ (N,E,z,g) is an attributed graph where N is a set of
nodes each representing a basic block, E4 (N  N) is a set of
edges which represents a control ﬂow statement, g is a
function that groups the instructions, and z is a function
which colors nodes according to the type of operations that
take place.ACFG construction
We use one compiler function (e.g., setprecision) to
illustrate the steps involved in translating CFG to ACFG, as
shown in Fig 4. The ﬁrst part on the left side represents the
standard control ﬂow graph. As illustrated in the middle
part, we convert each basic block in accordance with Table
3. Finally, function z converts these values to a speciﬁc
color.
Consider the last basic block in Fig. 4 which contains the
two instructions pop esi and retn. Function g groups the
two operators to STK and MSC, and the esi operand to REG.
To color the nodes, z intersects the opcode and operands
according to Table 3. For instance, DTR & STK ¼ 0 & 1 ¼ 0,
whileMSC¼ 1. Each basic block ends upwith a six-bit value
(e.g. 000001) whichwill be represented in a newgraph by a
decimal value equivalent to its binary. The ACFG captures
the control ﬂow semantics of a program, which contains
more information and hence provides more accuracy than
a CFG. An ACFG can convert equivalent compiler functions
to a similar ACFG because the compiler functions are
semantically similar. In contrast, a CFG deals only with the
structure of the function; since different functions may
have the same structure, this fact makes compiler function
identiﬁcation more difﬁcult.
Compiler constructor terminator (CCT)
One important application of call graphs and control
ﬂow graphs is in the recognition of compiler-related callTable 3
Patterns for annotation.
Feature Description Example
DTR & STK Data Transfer and Stack push, mov, etc
ATH & LGC Arithmetic and Logical add, xor, etc
CAL & TST Call and Test call, cmp, etc
REG & MEM Register and Memory esi, [esiþ4]
REG & CONST Register and Constant esi, 30
MSC Milestones MEM and Constsequences. Each compiler exhibits a relatively unique
signature for initialization, startup, and termination code.
In both the initialization and termination part of the pro-
gram, there are compiler functions that call other functions
or are called by other functions. The order of these func-
tions, number of nodes, ﬂow, and other characteristics are
some of the signatures that we use for the compiler
constructor terminator (CCT) feature.
During the execution of the system, the call graph of the
application is traversed until it reaches the main function.
Every sequence of function calls taking place before and
after the main function (initialization and terminators) is
recorded in the compiler constructor terminator (CCT) of
each compiler. Fig. 5 shows an example of a GCC compiler
constructor terminator.Third layer: Detection method
In certain applications, it may be necessary to match
subsets of multiple graphs. For instance, we consider the
initialization part of a call graph as a startup signature for
compiler identiﬁcation (compiler constructor terminator
proﬁle). In such cases, neighborhood hashing provides a
more reﬁned level of granularity compared to graph
encoding. In order to ﬁngerprint adjacent nodes, a neighbor
hash graph kernel (NHGK) can be applied to subsets of the
call graph (Gascon et al., 2013). The function Gmaps the set
of annotated graphs AG to a bit vector of length m.
G : AG/f0;1gm (6)
The neighborhood hash value h for a function fi and its
set of neighbor functions Nfi can be computed using the
following formula [8]:
hðfiÞ ¼ shr1ðGðfiÞÞ4

4fj2Nfi
G

fj

(7)
where shr1 denotes a one-bit shift right operation and 4
indicates the XOR function.
Evaluation
Data set
Gathering a data corpus for the evaluation of compiler
provenance extraction is challenging. For example, despite
the fact that collecting code from open-source projects may
be attractive, the source ﬁles usually have numerous de-
pendencies which complicates the compilation process.
Nonetheless, we choose four free open-source projects and
use them to test BinComp. In addition, we have gathered
programs written for the Google Code Jam (The Google
Code Jam, ) as well as university projects from a program-
ming course at our university. All of our data sets are
publicly accessible in (The data set, ).
We generate the binaries that make up our data set by
compiling the source codewith all applicable combinations
of compiler versions and optimization levels (O0 and O2),
as shown in Table 4. Our data set consists of 1177 ﬁles, 232
of which belong to the Google Code Jam data set, 933 of
Fig. 4. ACFG construction.
Fig. 5. Sample of GCC compiler constructor terminator.
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which belong to the Open Source Projects.
Evaluation results
We evaluate our compiler provenance approach using
the aforementioned data sets. We split the training data
into ten sets, reserving one set as a testing set, and using
nine sets as training sets to evaluate our approach; weTable 4
Data set compilation settings.
Compiler Version Optimization
GCC 3.4 O0
4.4 O2
ICC 10 O0
11 O2
VS 2010 O0
2012 O2
XCODE 5.1 O0
6.1 O2srepeat this process numerous times. To evaluation our
appraoch, we use precision (P) and recall (R) as follows.
P ¼ TP
TP þ FP (8)
R ¼ TP
TP þ FN (9)
Since our application domain is much more sensitive to
false positives than false negatives, we use the F-measure
as follows.
F0:5 ¼ 1:25 $ PR0:25P þ R (10)
Our results of F0:5 measure is summarized in Table 5.
As depicted separately in Fig. 6(aed), BinComp can
detect the VS compiler with an average accuracy of 0.97,
while ECP average accuracy is 0.93. The main explanation
for this difference lies in the type of features used in the
technique; BinComp uses different kind of features (syn-
tactical, structural, and semantical), whereas ECP uses only
syntactical features. In addition, we record the overall run
time and compare BinComp and ECP approaches in terms of
time complexity, as shown in Fig. 7.
We test BinComp using different variations of compiler
versions and optimization levels, as shown in Table 6 and
Table 7. Table 6 indicates that identifying the version ofTable 5
F0:5 results.
Feature F0:5(Data set ¼ 500 ﬁles) F0:5(Data set ¼ 1000 ﬁles)
Idioms 0.789 0.812
Graphlet 0.602 0.62
CF 0.72 0.745
CTP 0.694 0.708
CCT 0.807 0.877
CT 0.689 0.70
ACFG 0.634 0.671
Fig. 6. The accuracy against different compilers.
Fig. 7. Time efﬁciency.
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compiler and optimization levels. For instance, the accu-
racy to identify the version of XCode compiler is below
0.80. In addition, we observe that the features of VS and
XCode compilers are slightly different when we change
either the version or the optimization level, which makes
the detection process more challenging. However, the GCC
and ICC compilers produce more various code amongst
versions compared to the VS and XCode compilers.
We ﬁnd that up to 75% of the functions in our data set
are identical when generated by Visual Studio 2010 or 2012Table 6
Accuracy for variations of compiler versions.
Compiler Version Accuracy
GCC 3.4.x 86%
4.4.x 89%
ICC 10.x 83%
11.x 90%
VS 2010 70%
2012 71%
XCode 5.x 78%
6.1 74%
Table 7
Accuracy for variations of compiler optimization levels.
Compiler Optimization Average Accuracy
GCC O0, O2 91%
ICC O0, O2 89%
VS O0, O2 95%with the same optimization level. In other words, the code
generator in Visual Studio has remained relatively stable
between these versions, which offers an explanation for the
low accuracy for VS version detection. On the other hand,
we found that up to 85% of the functions of XCode are
identical among two versions. However, we have observed
changes in our proposed features for the GCC and ICC
compilers which allow us to detect the version and opti-
mization level bymeasuring the differences in the features.
A comparison between BinComp, ECP, and IDA Pro based
on four open source projects named SQLite, libpng, zlib, and
OpenSSL are illustrated in Fig. 8.We compile SQLite and zlib
with VS 2010 (O2), and the compiler is successfully iden-
tiﬁed by these three approaches; whereas libpng and
OpenSSL are compiled with GCC (O2), which IDA Pro is not
able to identify the source compiler of these binaries.
BinComp and ECP provide more accurate results in identi-
fying the VS compiler, while IDA cannot identify the GCC
compiler.Discussion and limitations
We evaluate compiler provenance recovery on different
data sets across several compiler families, versions, and
optimization levels. We check the applicability of the fea-
tures used in BinComp and the features used in the existing
techniques (e.g., idioms, Graphlet) to identify the compiler,
version, and optimization level based on our observations
during the experiments. For instance, CT has the same
pattern in the binaries that are compiled with the same
compiler. Furthermore, we formulate a template called
compiler transformation proﬁle (CTP) that maps the in-
structions underlying a binary according to the most likely
compiler family by which it was generated. We use such
features as a unique signature (ﬁngerprint) to identify aFig. 8. Comparison the accuracy of BinComp, ECP, and IDA Pro on free open-
source projects.
Table 8
Feature abstraction levels: instruction-level (inst), control ﬂow, and
external library (ext) interaction properties level.
Features Code property
Inst. Control ﬂow Ext.
Idioms *
Graphlet * * *
CF * *
CTP *
CCT * *
CT *
ACFG * * *
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and CCT) to identify the version and optimization level. The
variations in compiler provenance lead to variations in the
structure of the binary code. We introduce features that
capture detailed provenance at function-level granularity,
allowing us to recover the optimization levels used to
produce binary code. We design ACFG and compiler
constructor terminator (CCT) features to explicitly capture
such changes and identify the version.
BinComp uses different features that cover various as-
pects of the binary. Each feature captures one or more of
the code instruction-level (inst), control ﬂow, or external
library (ext) interaction properties, as shown in Table 8. The
features used in BinComp cover all aspects of compiler
transformations and behaviors.
BinComp still suffers from some limitations. For
instance, like most existing methods, BinCompworks under
the assumption that the binary code is already de-
obfuscated. In practice, the de-obfuscation of malware
can be very demanding. How to extract compiler prove-
nance directly over obfuscated code is an important but
very challenging future avenue of research. BinComp also
assumes the binary code is not stripped. In addition, for this
work, only Intel x86/x86-64 architecture is considered, and
we evaluate BinComp only over compiled Cþþ programs.
Conclusion
We have presented a technique called BinComp for
accurately and automatically recovering the compiler
provenance of program binaries using syntactical, seman-
tical, and structural features to capture the compiler
behavior. BinComp extracted speciﬁc features from pro-
gram binaries, which enabled us to build representative
and meaningful features to describe each compiler char-
acteristics better. Our results show that compiler prove-
nance can be extracted accurately. Moreover, the results
indicate that the approach was efﬁcient in terms of
computational resources and time requirements, and could
thus be considered as a practical approach for real-world
binary analysis.
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